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 In March 2016, in a small house in Yaoundé’s administrative quarter, a man 
hunched over an Excel spreadsheet: Frank, an OCHA technician was hired by the 
United Nations’ Office of  the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs to maintain 
a database of  needs in Cameroon. 1 On a small portable computer fixed with 
brown tape, Frank entered tables into the OCHA software, the  Needs Comparison 
Tools (NCT), in order to calculate the indicators and produce color maps that 
would inform the final report. This report, the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 
would become one of  the principal tools of  communication among the actors 
of  the crisis: The government of  Cameroon, the headquarters of  UN partners, 
NGOs and donors in Yaoundé, Geneva, and New York. 
 In the time of  the “data revolution” called for by the UN, the time of  “evidence-
based humanitarianism” and “data-driven decision-making,” 2 OCHA must jus-
tify the presence of  humanitarian agencies numerically. Frank therefore organized 
into large, colored columns, pieces of  information that have been given him by 
dozens of  experts, consultants, and volunteers, not only Cameroonian, but also 
American, Ethiopian, French, Nigerian, Japanese, and Swiss, on population cat-
egories as diverse as the villagers of  the tropical forest in East Cameroon, Central 
African refugees living in Adamawa, displaced persons fleeing Boko Haram in the 
Far North, the victims of  the Sahelian drought at the border with Chad, the vic-
tims of  floods, and the victims of  war. 3 These data have been the object of  numer-
ous hours of  preliminary negotiations between NGOs and other agencies, and 
they now had to be compiled. Frank added up the heterogeneous numbers pro-
duced by a small army of  economists, doctors, statisticians, and jurists. His soft-
ware allowed him to produce a synthesis of  “vulnerability” in Cameroon, and to 
estimate that 2.7 million “people in need” lived in this country: One in ten inhab-
itants lived below the thresholds fixed by humanitarian agencies. 4 This number 
not only permitted the UN to designate its humanitarian goal in Cameroon, but 
also immediately to locate Cameroon in a worldwide hierarchy of  needs. There 
were, according to OCHA, 125.3 million “people in need” on the planet in 2016. 5 
 Where did this number come from? How is the weight of  humanitarian needs 
on the planet calculated? The UN’s prose readily speaks about cutting-edge tech-
nologies, remote sensing, drones, and big data, but seeing Frank swearing in front 
of  his machine and turning his computer on and off  over and over because of  
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technical issues, one starts to wonder if  the reality is more prosaic than the digital 
dreams of  UN brochures. In this chapter and the one that follows, I will attempt 
to reconstruct the production chain of  this humanitarian figure, from individu-
als, to the local scale, all the way to the global scale. It has to do with observing 
how actors “rise in globality,” according to Christophe Bonneuil’s expression: 6 
how they construct the global. I will present the construction of  this figure as a 
series of  “tests,” relying on a concept of  pragmatic sociology. I will thus try to 
untangle the too-often confused threads of  figures and their use, of  high and do-
it-yourself  technology, of  knowledge and non-knowledge, and of  the certain and 
the uncertain. 
 This chapter is primarily interested in the way in which Cameroon has become 
an object of  humanitarian knowledge since 2014. Sections 1 and 2 describe how a 
“knowledge of  crisis” (using the expression of  Vincent Bonnecase) emerged, and 
how the production of  numbers became a competitive game among humanitar-
ian agencies. Even if  all large humanitarian agencies agree on the principle of  
impartiality (that is, the idea of  assisting first and foremost “people in need”), they 
do not, however, agree about the way these needs are calculated. On the one hand, 
some organizations, like the High Commissioner for Refugees, prefer a definition 
of  needs by status. The UNHCR was mandated by the UN General Assembly to 
“protect” refugees, a category defined according to international refugee law. 7 For 
other organizations, like OCHA or UNICEF, on the other hand, needs must be 
qualified according to “vulnerability” (a vulnerability or needs-based approach). 
For these agencies, the law says little about real needs: A refugee can be rich, 
whereas a non-refugee could be in need. After having shown that the definition 
and the quantification of  suffering is a strategic challenge for access to donor 
resources and access to the terrain, this chapter will consider the quantification 
of  needs according to legal status, first observing how UNHCR agents quantify 
refugees (Part 3), then other legal categories (Part 4). In the following chapter, we 
will see how the approach via “vulnerability” is asserted. 
 The best-established practice of  enumerating needs by law is the “registration” 
of  refugees. Registration thus constitutes a heuristic point of  entry in the study of  
“humanitarian government.” 8 It primarily deals with one of  the numbers consid-
ered the most “robust” by humanitarian agencies. Whereas other numbers, like the 
figures of  the “host population” or that of  “people in food insecurity” are less 
precise, the refugee figures are much rarely contested by the large agencies. The 
category of  refugees is a long-standing and widely recognized category. 9 In Cameroon, 
this figure was produced exclusively by one large agency, UNHCR. 10 In contrast to 
other countries in the region, like Burundi, the Democratic Republic of  the Congo, 
or Rwanda, there was no ministry for refugee registration in Cameroon in 2014: 11 
UNHCR did the work by itself. 12 This UN agency thus enjoyed a monopoly, both 
in the selection of  refugees and in the production of  numbers. 13 
 In Cameroon, it was not the state that counted refugees, the displaced, the 
hungry, the living, and the dead. International organizations have intervened for 
decades in the production of  statistics. Since the 1950s, international agencies have 
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for creating the population census. But a new era in the international governmen-
tality of  certain regions of  Africa may have begun: During “humanitarian crises,” 
international institutions were no longer content with financing research, provid-
ing tools, or harmonizing the indicators a posteriori; they at times dispensed with 
state institutions almost entirely. 
 How Cameroon has become the object of  humanitarian 
knowledge 
 Cameroon has only recently become the object of  humanitarian knowledge. Since 
the 1970s, Cameroon has seemed to have escaped the great Sahelian famines, 
mass violence, and genocidal war. It has long been an example of  a country with 
promise for development, since it has enjoyed important resources (petrol, gold, sea 
access, fertile land, varied climates). According to one German diplomat, “Cam-
eroon acted as an anchor of  stability in the region.” 15 However, the economic 
takeoff  never really took place. Economic growth stayed weak and was poorly 
allocated. 16 An aging political elite came to monopolize access to resources. 17 Paul 
Biya became Premier Minister in 1975, at a time when Leonid Brezhnev was lead-
ing the Soviet Union, and has been President of  the Republic since 1982. He has 
rarely left his residence outside of  Yaoundé, hardly ever appearing in public, often 
living at the Intercontinental Hotel in Geneva – probably knowing Swiss bankers 
better than he knows the rural populations of  his own country. 18 
 Biya’s government looked like a textbook case of  Foucaldian theory. The presi-
dent of  Cameroon seemed to apply to the letter the separation of  powers con-
ceived of  by the French philosopher, in every instance: The nation of  Cameroon 
exercised the power of  sovereignty in a caricatured manner; it availed itself  of  the 
right to “take life and let live” in spectacular fashion, multiplying police raids in 
the neighborhoods of  the big cities, leading lightning raids against Boko Haram 
in the north of  the country, conducting massive torture operations in the prisons, 
and staging the fiery destruction of  rebel or suspect villages. 19 Knowledge of  its 
populations, on the other hand, the management of  their well-being, the power 
of  governmentality, that which depends on an assemblage of  knowledge about 
the living and that reserves for itself  the right of  “make live and let die” – all 
that has held little interest for Paul Biya. The state progressively disengaged from 
health services, social services, and education – disengagement in part encouraged 
by the structural adjustment programs of  the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 20 Life expectancy in Cameroon has declined from 1991 to 
2005, going from 53.5 to 51.5 years. 21 The poverty figures have increased strongly, 
going from 7.1 million in 2007 to 8.1 million in 2014. 22 Political scientists have 
dubbed Cameroon’s political regime a “perpetual government,” a “government by 
negligence,” and a “stationary state.” 23 
 The Cameroonian state was not preoccupied with accumulating data on its 
population. Even the most basic information was missing: Birth records were 
lacking, the personal data records were incomplete, and the population census 
only took place every ten years. 24 This disinterest of  the state for governmental 
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knowledge was not solely the result of  a lack of  means, it was also the result of  
a specific history. This state was constructed after the colonial era, not based on 
a keen understanding of  its population, but on the control of  external resources: 
It was the “gatekeeper state” described by Frederick Cooper. 25 The colonial and 
postcolonial state became voluntarily disinterested in information about popula-
tions. It delegated this task to other actors: 26 political parties, unions, churches, 
and more and more to NGOs and international organizations. The interest of  
the latter has become compounded in the last 20 years, as Western states and 
donors have demonstrated concern in better knowing the peripheral zones (so-
called “ungoverned” zones) considered to be potential sources of  danger (terror-
ism, trafficking, epidemics, undocumented migration). 27 As Mark Duffield writes, 
this knowledge of  remote government intervenes when the population considered 
to be “ungoverned people” becomes, in the donors’ view, “unmanageable” and 
“uncontained.” 28 
 2014 was a turning point. In a few months, Cameroon was classified a “human-
itarian crisis situation” by the UN. Before that, Cameroon had already experi-
enced crises – but it had not been the subject of  a rapid increase in humanitarian 
inquiries. There had been regular arrivals of  Nigerian and Central African refu-
gees, notably large in 2004, 2007, and 2009. But UNHCR considered the ques-
tion of  Central African refugees in Eastern Cameroon to be almost resolved. The 
some 102,112 Central African refugees did not seem to be posing any more of  a 
problem in 2013; they lived in the villages or in the cities. 29 The UNHCR spoke 
of  “local integration,” a “durable solution,” and an “integration rate” of  80%. 30 
The UN agency thought that the social and cultural proximity between the Cen-
tral African refugees and the residents of  Eastern Cameroon (of  whom many are 
cattle farmers, Muslim, and Fula-speaking) would facilitate their integration. 31 At 
the end of  2013, UNHCR therefore decided to reduce its activities and close its 
regional office in Bertoua. 
 It is in January 2014 that the situation changed rapidly in the Eastern region, 
with the sudden arrival of  thousands of  Central African refugees. The “anti-
Balaka” militias that seized the Central African towns of  Berbérati, Carnot, and 
Bouar at the end of  2013 exercised great violence and provoked a mass exodus. 32 
In February 2014, UNHCR sent a small team to register refugees in the bor-
der stations (Gari Gombo, Kenzou, Gbiti, Toktoyo, Garoua-Mboulaï, Gbatoua 
Godolé, Ngaoui, Yamba). 33 The Red Cross and MSF provided first aid. In March 
2014, during the catastrophe, the Cameroonian government created an inter-
departmental committee for the sake of  the refugee question, to coordinate the 
emergency response. 34 In May 2014, UNHCR counted 83,995 Central African 
refugees having arrived since January. 35 
 Humanitarian organizations, journalists, and diplomats thus multiplied obser-
vational missions in Eastern Cameroon. 36 They described an alarming situation. 
Refugees lived with families, in rented rooms, in schools, hangars, mosques, or 
outdoors. In Kenzou, the soccer field was transformed into a large camp where the 
refugees slept on the ground. In other places, they constructed shelters from plastic 
tarpaulins and raffia leaves. Some refugees came in their personal vehicles, others 
 Figure 5.2  Refugee sites and entry points for new refugees from the Central African Republic. 
Source: Courtesy of  UNHCR
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by bus, packed onto flatbed trucks, others were transported by the African-led 
International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), still oth-
ers came on foot and on the backs of  cattle, hiding regularly in the bush to escape 
the anti-Balaka. 37 The first reports described the refugees as exhausted, sick, and 
often injured by machetes. The reports talk about refugees feeding themselves 
with leaves or roots, or living off  of  sporadic gifts from different groups; they 
counted many injured, and many sick with diarrhea, malaria, and measles. 
 In spite of  this situation, aid came late. The UNHCR was not prepared for such 
a large crisis, and other organizations present in the region had reduced staff. 38 
The world’s eyes were turned elsewhere: The Syrian crisis, the Ebola epidemic 
in West Africa, the Central African interior. The UNHCR took its time obtain-
ing sites from the Cameroonian government to move the refugees in – UNHCR 
wanted sites open to the villages, whereas the government wanted enclosed camps 
allowing them to control entry. 39 Bulldozers ended up digging trenches in the 
tropical forest to establish small tent camps, but the refugee transport from the 
border posts to these sites (Lolo, Mbilé, Timangolo, Gado, Mborguene, Ngam, 
and Borgop) 40 was slow-going. Refugees had sometimes to wait for several weeks 
or several months at the border stations to be able to obtain their papers and their 
ration cards. A rough countryside, bumpy laterite roads, and faulty infrastructure 
put the brakes on operations. The border between Cameroon and the Central 
African Republic was more than 600 kilometers long; refugees were registered at 
29 passage points recognized by UNHCR, but in reality, many people crossed the 
border in other places. In the towns, infrastructure was overwhelmed – the nutri-
tion center in Batouri, with 12 beds, sheltered more than 100 children – whereas 
in the villages, the great dispersal of  refugees made it hard to replenish supplies. In 
May, the World Food Programme declared itself  soon out of  stock and said that it 
had not received any new donations allowing it to purchase more food. 41 
 Only in May 2014 did the crisis start to be taken more seriously. A report by 
MSF demonstrated the gravity of  the situation. Having been present in Camer-
oon for more than 20 years, in different regions of  the country (notably for its 
projects of  health, nutrition, and HIV/AIDS), MSF had been involved since the 
first arrivals of  refugees at the border with first aid, support for hospitals, and the 
management of  nutrition centers. 42 In March, an epidemiologist from MSF led 
a short, retrospective mortality inquiry at the Gbiti cemetery. Since the tombs of  
newly arrived refugees were recognizable, he estimated that the mortality rate 
was a good deal higher than the emergency threshold. 43 At the request of  MSF 
Switzerland,  Epicentre – MSF’s center for epidemiological research – thus launched 
an inquiry on mortality and acute malnutrition. 44 For three weeks, four inspectors 
inquired four different sites (the town of  Garoua-Mboulaï, the camp of  Gado 
Badzere, the town of  Gbiti, and the camp of  Gbiti). 45 With the help of  four nurses, 
they supervised the work of  56 “community liaisons” that visited the families (the 
“households”) and took children’s measurements (the brachial perimeter and 
observations of  edemas). The community liaisons were Cameroonian Red Cross 
volunteers and Central Africans chosen from among the refugees, all trained for 
three days in rapid techniques to evaluate malnutrition and in collecting data via 
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questionnaires. Working on the refugee welcome centers, the community liaisons 
were the intermediaries between the NGOs and the aid beneficiaries – they were 
those who knew the families best. The investigators counted 60,611 people (refu-
gees and residents) at these sites, and established gross mortality rates and acute 
malnutrition rates higher than the emergency threshold, concluding the existence 
of  “a high mortality rate and alarming malnutrition rates.” 46 
 The report constituted a quantitative critique of  UNHCR’s activity: Not only 
did UNHCR get the number of  refugees wrong (in the studied camps, the number 
of  people surveyed by MSF significantly passed the number of  refugees registered 
by UNHCR – in some places, by more than 10%), 47 but the UN organization 
also underestimated the gravity of  the situation. The MSF report contributed 
to the accumulation of  indices that converged in April – May 2014. The UN’s 
Emergency Relief  Coordinator (ERC) disbursed an emergency fund of  4.1 mil-
lion USD for the Central African refugees in Cameroon, and UNHCR made a 
public appeal for 22.6 million USD for Central African refugees. At the end of  
May, the WFP and IOM declared Cameroon to be in a state of  maximum emer-
gency (level 3, L3). 
 Two months later, the diagnostic of  the Cameroonian humanitarian “three 
crises” was established: 1) In the East, the crisis of  the Central African civil war – 
with around 253,000 Central African refugees in Cameroon in 2015, essentially 
spread out in the regions of  the East and Adamawa. 2) In the North, the crisis of  
refugees and the displaced fleeing the war with Boko Haram, with around 65,000 
Nigerian refugees and 93,000 Cameroonian displaced in 2015, in the regions of  
the North and the Far North (also called the Extreme North). 3) Finally, also in the 
North, the “Sahelian crisis” that combined a structural fragility of  agro-pastoral 
activities in an arid region and weak harvests leading to food insecurity touching a 
fifth of  households and malnutrition rates near the emergency threshold. 48 
 Competing for leadership in the humanitarian field 
 Ever since Cameroon entered this crisis state, UN agencies competed for the lead-
ership of  humanitarian operations. In effect, Cameroon posed a problem for the 
UN’s bureaucracy: Humanitarian actors provided assistance for refugees (Cen-
tral African and Nigerian) as well as assistance for non-refugees (internal Cam-
eroonian displaced people, Cameroonians in food insecurity, the malnourished, 
etc.). According to the UN’s rules of  action for humanitarian crises, in a  refugee 
aid situation , it is UNHCR that ought to bear the responsibility for the humanitar-
ian response. UNHCR was already present in Cameroon and had already been 
working with Central African refugees since 2007. It enjoyed significant logistical 
capacity on the ground and a network of  local partners. But the organization was 
late to react to the new crisis and received critique from NGOs. 49 
 The headquarters in Geneva reacted by replacing the UNHCR country rep-
resentative by a new one. In the meantime, the heavyweights of  international 
aid logistics – UNICEF, WFP, WHO – got organized. In February 2015, the UN 
Coordinator of  Humanitarian Affairs named the UN’s Resident Coordinator, 
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Najat Rochdi (who was also the director of  the UN’s Development Programme, 
UNDP), as its humanitarian coordinator. 50 Her responsibility was therefore to 
coordinate humanitarian action, not only by the UN, but NGOs as well. Despite 
the critique, UNHCR refused to work with other UN organizations. A power 
struggle ensued, resulting in a compromise: East Cameroon would be coordinated 
by UNHCR, whereas in the North, UNHCR and OCHA would share the lead, 
thus inaugurating a legal innovation: The joint UNHCR-OCHA strategy on 
“mixed situations.” 51 
 Competition for control of  the humanitarian field in Cameroon was fueled by 
an age-old conflict in the heart of  the UN world. Since the 1960s, several UN 
agencies had affirmed their claim to coordinating humanitarian aid in times of  
crisis: The UNDP, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNICEF, and the 
WFP were just some of  the large agencies that had the means to claim to coordi-
nate large logistical operations on the ground. But in the context of  the increase 
of  numbers of  refugees and the displaced, UNHCR knew to re-establish itself  as 
an actor from the first plan. From the 1980s on, UNHCR had positioned itself  
more and more as the natural coordinator of  humanitarian crises. The power 
and the limits of  UNHCR resided in a clear mandate, founded on a precise legal 
definition – the protection of  refugees and stateless persons, as written in its man-
date of  1951. 52 UNHCR – unlike UNICEF or the FAO – is not, properly speak-
ing, an “agency” of  the UN; it is an administrative service under the authority of  
one person, the High Commissioner for Refugees, directly linked to the UN Sec-
retary-General. 53 This administration was equipped with a vertical structure, “a 
quasi-military chain of  command.” 54 Its legitimacy derived from the figure of  the 
High Commissioner, a known political or diplomatic personality who selects his or 
her own personnel, over whom he or she reigned with personal and often patriar-
chal authority (those who were there in the 1950s nostalgically evoked memories 
of  soirées during which all UNHCR personnel gathered around a piano while the 
High Commissioner played Christmas carols). 55 
 From a limited mandate at the start – limited to European refugees before 1951 – 
UNHCR has expanded its reach – first, to refugees from all continents, then to 
other legal categories outside of  its original mandate: The internally displaced, 
returnees, host populations (see  Chapter 2 ). UNHCR has been a fast-growing 
UN agency. 56 The UNHCR was today in every country in Africa. 57 It acts as 
a “global” government for displaced persons. 58 However, the organization has 
conserved its original centralized and vertical structure, founded on loyalty to the 
person of  the High Commissioner (relying on its “Country Representatives”), a 
structure that facilitated negotiations with nations. 59 
 Competition for humanitarian leadership became clear in the 1990s. In 1991, 
the UN General Assembly created a new structure for humanitarian coordina-
tion: 60 It appointed an Emergency Relief  Coordinator (ERC), who was supposed 
to be the unique focal point for natural and humanitarian catastrophes. This ERC, 
which became the Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, was sup-
ported by a Department of  Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) that became the Office 
for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs in 1998. This UN organization 
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was doubled by a second structure that brought together UN agencies, Red Cross 
organizations, and NGOs, called the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). 61 
Unity was assured by the headperson of  the ERC, who presided over the IASC. 
 In 2005, the ERC and the IASC launched a “Humanitarian Reform,” the aim 
of  which was to improve the “efficacy” of  humanitarian response by improving 
“predictability, accountability, responsibility and partnership” and which was based 
on an “agreed division of  labor.” 62 In 2011, after a first evaluation of  humanitarian 
reform, a new reform was adopted: The “Transformative Agenda” that continued 
to accent the horizontal, egalitarian, and participative character of  humanitarian 
coordination. 
 The 2005 reform anticipated that throughout the great humanitarian crises, aid 
actors should group by activity sector, in “clusters.” Each activity sector – nutrition, 
logistics, health, food, etc. – was coordinated by one organization that was ulti-
mately responsible for the group’s activities. 63 This reform thus corresponded to 
a kind of  humanitarian Yalta: On the one hand, it reaffirmed the preeminence 
of  UN agencies in relation to NGOs – only one NGO, Save the Children, had a 
“cluster lead” role; 64 on the other hand, it shared tasks among the large competi-
tors for humanitarian leadership – UNICEF, WFP, FAO, UHNCR. At the center 
of  this structure, OCHA played the role of  coordinator of  the coordinators. 65 
 The cluster arrangement was rapidly subject to much criticism: The reform had 
a multiplier effect on coordination tasks – it multiplied meetings, bid solicitations, 
partnerships, operational guides, memoranda, groups, sub-groups, and meeting 
protocols. At the same time, it disconnected the coordination tasks and the opera-
tional tasks: The UN agencies were “cluster leads” even in the cases where they 
were less present on the ground than certain NGOs. 
 But the bitterest resistance to the cluster reform came from the High Commis-
sioner for Refugees: UNHCR successfully forbade the cluster system to apply to 
situations in which refugees were involved. The organization accepted the cluster 
system for all crises that did not involve refugees (and, in their case, UNHCR 
was content to be the sectorial leader in three areas: Protection, camps, and shel-
ter). However, for crises that involved refugees, UNHCR reserved coordination 
rights. The UNHCR’s response to the OCHA reform fit into a three-page memo, 
distributed to its employees in November 2013, in which the High Commis-
sioner explained why UNHCR was not adopting the cluster model, but instead 
developed its own model, the “Refugee Response Coordination Model.” 66 The 
High Commissioner started by placing, as a first step, an important limit on the 
“Transformative Agenda”: In his view, the Transformative Agenda did not apply 
in refugee aid situations. 67 It explained why refugees were a separate case, differ-
ent from all others because they had particular needs. 68 By virtue of  its mandate, 
UNHCR was the only organization qualified to coordinate this kind of  response. 
As a second step, UNHCR reserved, in these cases, a specific role for itself  in all 
strategic functions: Direct appeal (that is, the connection with the powers of  the 
host country and with donors), strategic planning (the distribution of  funds), refu-
gee consultation (the connection to the aid beneficiaries), and the Refugee Protec-
tion Working Group (the connection with the NGOs). The third step: The High 
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Commissioner specified that it reserved certain prerogatives for itself  in “mixed 
situations” as well, that is, situations where there were refugees, even if  the crisis 
includes non-refugee victims. Even in “mixed situations,” the High Commissioner 
reserved absolute leadership on the questions of  international “protection,” and 
maintained a direct line of  communication, through the intermediary of  the rep-
resentative country, with the government of  the host country. 69 
 The UNHCR’s aggressive positioning corresponded to a “realist” reading of  
the humanitarian field considered as a permanent power balance – the High Com-
missioner wanted to tranform his agency into the UN agency for protection in all 
instances of  displacement (refugees, the displaced, or victims of  natural catastro-
phes), in an extremely competitive humanitarian market. 70 In the 1990s, when the 
UN General Assembly created a more horizontal and cooperative coordination 
structure, founded on a bureaucratic culture inspired by New Public Management, 
aiming at the professionalization of  the humanitarian, functional specialization, 
and evaluation according to indicators, UNHCR led logistical operations on a 
large scale in the Balkans (1991) and Rwanda (1994). The high ranking functionar-
ies of  UNHCR today proved themselves in that period – their legitimacy comes 
from their effectiveness on the ground, their capacity for logistical organization, 
and a “hands on” culture. 71 
 The “joint note on mixed situations” from UNHCR and OCHA was applied 
for the first time to Cameroon. 72 Despite the humanitarian reform in 2005 and 
2011, UNHCR managed to maintain its preserve: The protection of  refugees 
and displaced persons. 73 The joint note anticipated that OCHA and UNHCR 
should compile a common analysis of  the situation, develop a common vision for 
the response (a “Strategic Response Plan”) with a common appeal, and mobilize 
and allocate resources in a coordinated fashion. Two lines of  responsibilities were 
maintained in parallel: On the one hand, there was the IASC/OCHA in Geneva, 
which named a Humanitarian Coordinator in the country concerned, supported 
by a Humanitarian Country Team that developed a Strategic Response Plan to 
coordinate the work of  clusters or operational sectors. On the other hand, we find 
UNHCR in Geneva, which named a Country Representative in the country, which 
developed a Refugee Preparedness and Strategic Response Plan with UNHCR 
personnel, the on-site operations of  which were coordinated by UNHCR. 
 In 2015, the Cameroonian humanitarian field stabilized: The “Joint Note” 
was applied to North Cameroon (to Maroua, regarding the crisis of  Sahel/Boko 
Haram); UNHCR continued to reign in the East (for the crisis of  the Central 
African refugees); whereas in Yaoundé, OCHA and UNHCR coexisted, each 
developing a diagnostic of  the situation and a response strategy. The UNHCR 
thus considered Cameroon the conjunction of  two regional crises: It made a plan 
of  action (a “Refugees Regional Response Plan”) on the Central African crisis 
that included a chapter on Cameroon, and a plan of  action on the Nigerian cri-
sis, which also included a chapter on Cameroon. For its part, OCHA produced 
a plan of  action at the national scale of  Cameroon (a Humanitarian Response 
Plan) that proceeded in a sectorial manner – nutrition, food, logistics, etc. – and 
included a chapter on the protection of  refugees and the displaced that was edited 
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by UNHCR. The situation therefore resulted from a double power balance 
between OCHA and UNHCR, at once at the headquarters and on the ground, 
OCHA being the legitimate organization of  humanitarian coordination in prin-
ciple, but since establishing its regional bureau in Dakar, acting with a relatively 
reduced presence on the ground; 74 UNHCR, having large logistical means but 
criticized about its coordinating legitimacy. The belated response from UNHCR 
to the Central African crisis was “very abnormal” according to some; it may have 
increased the number of  those that died of  malnutrition: “it’s a shame,” con-
cluded one UNICEF expert. 75 It is true, a high-ranking official in UNHCR thus 
conceded, that “the UNHCR is a somewhat stubborn organization.” 76 In order to 
justify its claims over humanitarian leadership, the production of  robust figures is 
key to UNHCR. This starts with the  registration of  refugees. 
 Needs through the lens of  legal status (1): 
Counting refugees 77 
 At the end of  2014, UNHCR had registered “198,890 refugees” from the Central 
African Republic in Cameroon. 78 How was this figure produced? Registration is at 
the heart of  UNHCR’s work. The process of  registration, verification, and updating 
of  relative information to the persons relevant to UNHCR’s jurisdiction 79 is the 
moment of  the refugees’ entry into the humanitarian sphere. Registration, as it is con-
ceived by UNHCR, brings together two goals that are never separated: To provide ref-
ugees with documents allowing them to assert their rights, and to produce statistics. 80 
 During the last 50 years, UNHCR has thus been endowed with specialized 
tools for this purpose – giving rise to grey literature constituting almost a “science 
of  registration.” 81 This knowledge gave rise to the construction of  an agglom-
eration called the “refugee population” or “refugee community.” 82 For 20 years, 
UNHCR statisticians and Microsoft engineers have developed a data processing 
tool dedicated to registration activity: ProGres software (the ProGres Refugee 
Registration Platform). This project was born from a pilot project undertaken in 
Kosovo in 1999 – the “Refugee Registration Field Kits,” a project generalized in 
2002 with the launch of  Project Profile, aiming at the creating of  a unique data-
base. The UNHCR thus fused different instruments and databases (camp popula-
tions, protection files, food distribution, repatriation files, relocation files). One of  
the declared goals of  Project Profile was to furnish governments – those of  donors 
and the host countries – with solid figures on refugee numbers. 83 ProGres software 
allowed one to link the collection of  personal data, the construction of  a statistical 
aggregate, the production of  localized and mappable data, and the production 
of  individual documents for the refugees (the latest versions integrated biometric 
information: Fingerprint or pupil recognition), all in one single tool. 
 The UNHCR manuals anticipated that registration occurred in four stages: 
First, a preparation stage, with information about refugees for a forthcoming 
registration, and with approximate estimates of  the size of  the population to be 
registered. Second, a phase for collecting information and delivering the iden-
tity documents. Third, a data-entry phase using the ProGres database. Fourth, 
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verification and updating of  data. The moments of  interaction between agencies 
and refugees (camp visits, food distributions, beginning of  the school year, etc.) 
could be used to update the data. 84 
 The UNHCR manuals nevertheless give a too-slick image of  registration. Even in 
critical literature, UNHCR is often presented as a powerful institution, almost omni-
scient, acting in a rational fashion. The literature on refugee aid, including critical 
literature that made UNHCR out to be a dominant institution in the service of  the 
Western nations, often tends to overestimate the power of  this organization. The 
near-monopoly of  refugee figures confers an aura on UNHCR that tends to make 
one forget that, on the ground, the grasp on local situations is often fragile and based 
on trial and error. Let us look closer at one day of  registering refugees in Cameroon. 
 In December 2014, the UNHCR office in Batouri was informed that several 
hundreds of  refugees waited to be registered in Kenzou. Kenzou was located at 
the border between Cameroon and Central Africa. A township of  16,147 inhabit-
ants before 2014, the town had been one of  the principal entry points for Central 
African refugees since February 2014. At the end of  the year, some 40,000 refu-
gees lived in the township, while others had been relocated to the camp in Lolo. 
But new refugees arrived in November and December, and they had not yet been 
registered. 85 Two white Jeeps with UNHCR logos were sent to the border to per-
form the last registration session of  the year. 
 7:15am 
 The UNHCR team arrives at the laterite soccer field in Kenzou. Several dozen 
people are already waiting for them, including women in colorful  boubous and 
shawls, some in black, and men in white and cream-colored boubous, some in 
shirts. All of  them get up as the white Jeep arrives. They form two rows: One 
row of  men, one of  women and children. It is not yet hot, but they are protecting 
themselves from the sun with large colorful umbrellas. They will wait for several 
hours – some for several days – before reaching the registration tables. 
 The eight UNHCR representatives exit the Jeeps: Two protection clerks, Alain 
and Wlad, accompanied by four United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) and two driv-
ers. 86 In the courtyard, they greet the refugee volunteers, members of  a local “ref-
ugee committee,” who will help them, making the connection with the candidates 
to be registered, and translating from Fula to French. 87 
 The materials are installed on the stadium grandstand, a slab of  concrete with 
stairs covered by a sheet metal roof: Two small wooden stables, three plastic tables, 
a dozen chairs, a large diesel generator to power the portable computers, web-
cams, printer, and laminator; the whole thing is connected via a converter by 
a mix of  cables and power strips. It is an “open air bureaucracy” – one has to 
pack everything out: Lists and information sheets, cardstock, laminated sheets, 
pens, ration cards, sheets, hole punchers, stamps, ink cartridges. 88 Every omission 
can cost several hours’ travel to Lolo, the refugee camp where UNHCR stocks 
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materials. Finally, they set up the divider that defines the work space, the waiting 
area in the courtyard, and the soccer stadium. Then someone starts up the elec-
tricity generator; it makes a hellish racket. One has to shout to be heard. 
 Registration can now begin. There will be three stations: 1) Screening, which 
is the purview of  the two protection clerks, who seek to establish the candidates’ 
eligibility for refugee status; 2) entry of  the candidates’ personal data (last name, 
first name, date of  birth, places lived, etc.) in the database, with photos taken; 3) 
finally, the printing, stamping, and laminating of  the AGF or ProGres documents 
that constitute the refugees’ identity cards. The UNHCR delivers one ProGres 
document per adult, along with one ration card per household. The candidates in 
the registration process do not proceed immediately from one station to the other – 
they wait for several hours or several days even to reach the welcome table, leave 
it with a token (a little slip of  green paper), and come back the next day or the day 
after that for the data entry process, for which they must also wait many hours. 
 9:00am 
 At the screening table, the protection clerk interrogates the candidates. Some of  
them arrive with identity papers – a Central African national identity card, a 
driver’s license, birth certificates. But most have declared that their papers were 
lost when fleeing. Others still present what they have: A school report card or 
transcript, an old ration card, a prison release certificate. Sometimes they speak 
French, sometimes Fula, often both, going from one to the other, repeating words – 
the noise of  the generator obliges them to raise their voices. 
 The UNHCR registers individuals by household. The organization has a flex-
ible definition of  the word – in principle, one can choose to form a household 
with whomever one likes, there is no compulsion to prove family ties. In practice, 
the clerks prefer to work with families, since it simplifies the interview. At the 
 Figure 5.3 Kenzou, December 2014: Asylum seekers waiting to register.  
Source: ©Glasman
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beginning of  the interview, the clerk reassembles the families and to three women 
sitting on a small wooden bench, they address the eldest, pointing at the others: 
 “Who is she to you?” 
 “She’s the older sister.” 
 “Whose older sister? Hers? How many are they? Four? Four?” A moment 
of  hesitation, then: “Ah, is there a baby in that scarf ?” 
 A man approaches, accompanied by two women and four children: “That’s 
your wife? Yes? And she is your wife as well? No, she is her sister? You, go rejoin 
your husband!” 
 A small group approaches. The clerk counts 19 people, including two infants, 
and a young girl who is eating a Plumpy’Sup. He takes ten minutes to sort out the 
group, having some sit down on the bench where only three people can fit side by 
side, having others get up, moving children to the left, then to the right. “Who is 
that?” “That is my family.” [pointing people out] “Who is she to you?” “That’s 
 Figure 5.4 Setting up cables to provide electricity for the laptops.  
Source: ©Glasman
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 Figure 5.5 A diesel generator provides electricity to register refugees .
Source: ©Glasman
my daughter.” “By what mother?” “And who is that?” “That’s her sister.” “Same 
father, same mother?” The clerk recaps: There is one head of  the family (a man), 
one wife (with seven children), the mother of  the head of  the family, three sisters 
of  the head, his second wife (with her five children). Now, the man takes two Pro-
Gres documents from his pocket – the two wives are already registered as refugees, 
one of  them in Yaoundé. The clerk stutters: “They are already registered? Why 
are you here?” “To register the two children [two adolescents] who are not reg-
istered yet.” Indeed, as UNHCR procedures require, in order to add people to a 
ProGres card, the whole group must come to have the old documents destroyed 
and replace them with a new one. 
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 Once the family connections are established, the clerk wants to know the 
nationality of  the candidates, their town of  origin, and the date of  their arrival 
in Cameroon. The procedure adopted in Cameroon is that of   prima facie recon-
naissance – a specific procedure, widely used in Africa by UNHCR, that allows 
a provisional refugee status to be accorded to individuals provided that they 
are members of  a group. 89 The ordinary procedure wants to establish that the 
demand is well-established on a person-by-person basis, to establish that individ-
uals have fled their country due to “a well-founded fear of  being persecuted.” 90 
According to the  prima facie procedure, it is enough to show that an individual is 
part of  a group fearing persecution – which is often much faster to demonstrate. 
 The clerk thus seeks to establish that the people being questioned have come 
from Cameroon due to persecution by the anti-Balaka in Central Africa: “How 
long ago did you arrive? Before or after Ramadan? After the sheep festival? But 
that was in October – why did you not come to register?” To a young man who is 
sitting beside an old woman, a young woman, and two children: 
 “What are you to her?” 
 “She’s my sister. Her husband left for Yaoundé. He is a logger.” 
 “And the old woman?” 
 “My mother.” 
 [pointing to the young woman] “Why don’t you have the same name?” 
 Figure 5.6 Building an open-air bureaucracy: Tables, chairs, printer. 
Source: ©Glasman
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 “But we don’t have the same father!” 
 “And the mother?” 
 “No, not the same mother either. She’s my uncle’s daughter.” 
 . . . 
 “And who is your father?” 
 “He’s Cameroonian.” 
 “But he was born in Bouar [in Central Africa].” 
 “Yes, but my brother, he has so often said, ‘I am Cameroonian, I am 
Cameroonian.’” 
 “But he’s not Cameroonian!” 
 “No, he’s Central African.” 
 Sometimes it takes time to understand each other, to spell out the names of  places, 
to locate towns, asking the translator to show where the places are. Carnot, Ber-
bérati, Bouar – the large towns are known. Sometimes it is more difficult: 
 “What village are you from?” 
 “De Gaulle?” 
 “De Gaulle? De Gaulle is a village in Central Africa? Yes?” 
 Bursts of  laughter. Yes: De Gaulle, also called Koui, is a village in Central Africa, 
thus christened by President Bokassa upon the general’s death. 
 Often, the questions are indiscreet: “Where do you come from? Why? Where 
do you live? With whom?” 
 “How long have you been in Kenzou?” 
 “For five months.” 
 “Five months?” “Why haven’t they been registered?” 
 Sometimes, they are intimate, or painful: “How old is the child? One? Does she 
breastfeed him?” “Are you nursing the child? Since when have you been married? 
You don’t have a child?” “He is lost.” “Lost?” “Dead.” 
 The clerk often repeats his questions, because he does not get a response, or 
because he finds the response too long, or too vague, or too unbelievable. They 
start to seem like commands: “Where was she born? Where was she born? Where 
was she born? She doesn’t know where she was born? How old is she?” He repeats 
his order to the translator, asking him not to suggest responses: “Don’t ask ‘Do 
you come from Berbérati, or from somewhere else?’ Just ask ‘Where do you come 
from?’ Don’t say ‘You got here before October,’ but rather ask ‘When did you 
arrive?’” Sometimes, the clerk is not satisfied with the responses. “But you are 
Cameroonian!” he says, and refuses to give them refugee status. To others, when 
he has exhausted his questions, when he has established at the same time the list of  
family members, he gives them the green token and dismisses them with a wave. 
Then he says, “Next!” 
 Figure 5.7 UNHCR clerk interview with asylum seeker with the help of  an interpreter. 
 Figure 5.8 Handwritten registration sheet .
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 10:30am 
 The queue has lost its orderliness. People are sitting in the courtyard, because the 
podiums form seating, and because the covering offers a little protection from the 
sun. Sometimes, the clerk asks the people set up near the table to return to the 
line. Other times, the refugees in the queue get too loud, having stood for several 
hours, and the refugees of  the committee, who try to manage the queue, replace 
the cord and make the people move back. Once in a while, the two clerks stop the 
interviews, walk down the courtyard steps, and reconstruct the line. 
 Some men in boubous refuse to wait their turn in line. One after the other, they 
come to sabotage the line, passing in front of  everyone, shunting the line aside. 
People get upset, raise their voices, push each other. The wait is long. UNHCR 
protocol did not anticipate having to usher these old men in front of  everyone else. 
It is neither “elderly first,” nor “women and children first.” In the tests, before 
registration – that is, before special needs are inscribed in the database – all indi-
viduals are, in principle, equal. The line makes it spatially clear that there are no 
priorities. 91 The UNHCR hardly cares about the fine distinctions of  local societ-
ies. Its social world is flat. Alain, the protection clerk who knows the Mbororo soci-
ety best because he himself  is from a Fula family, tries to translate. Sometimes, he 
stops the whole process to step aside with a handful of  people. They talk at length. 
 One elderly man threatens him: “I read the Koran!” (= “I know what’s what!”). 
He responds: “I was born to an old man” (= “I wasn’t born yesterday.”). Another 
tries to negotiate in order to skip the line: “If  I bring my cattle to the bush, will you 
find me a way?” (= “will you let me cut the line?”). 
 1:00pm 
 The other waiting line – that of  selected refugees who have received the token – 
ends at the second station, the table where the data is electronically entered. 92 A 
UNV enters the personal data in the ProGres database. The data comes from the 
family document held by the clerk, but he needs to verify it, spelling the names 
again, repeating what has already been said. Finally comes the moment when the 
photos are taken. It is rather happy. It has been long-awaited. Finally, the fam-
ily climbs onto the platform, underneath the courtyard covering, and they see 
the light at the end of  the tunnel and are relieved. One member of  the family 
holds a small white sheet behind the person to be photographed, then the webcam 
starts up. “We are rolling!” The aides motion that the scarf  or shawl needs to be 
removed – the family takes advantage of  the moment to put itself  back together, 
adjust their clothes, quickly fix their hair. Smile. 
 Now it is an infant’s turn to be photographed. The mother is seated, the infant 
on her lap, the father holds the sheet – which must be held between the mother 
and infant to make a white background. The UNV taps on the screen so that the 
infant will look straight ahead, in the direction of  the webcam. The baby looks 
right, the UNV taps, the baby looks left, the UNV taps. The crowd laughs. The 
baby looks at the crowd, the UNV taps. 
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 2:00pm 
 The waiting line has not gone down. It is sprawling, melting slowly under the 
weight of  the heat and the wait, it breaks down into clusters, sets up under the 
courtyard covering. It is no longer noisy. The generator is turning. The tension is 
mounting. It is hot and the wait is long. They understand that the wait could last 
several days. In the courtyard, people eat and drink, a group of  children plays a 
rhyming game, slapping each others’ hands in rhythm. One child cries. An old 
man has spread out a small mat to sit on, a boy is selling kola nuts. Now the old 
man chews his kola slowly, sitting up as straight as the letter I in the middle of  the 
commotion. 
 On the laterite soccer field, the boys are playing with a pink balloon. Further 
off, the men are bent over in afternoon prayer. 
 4:00pm 
 At the third station, a UNV prints the ProGres (or ACF) documents under the 
attentive gaze of  those who have now officially gained the title of  “refugees.” The 
printer prints, the UNV stamps, the laminator laminates the papers. To reach the 
table, one has to move the cables aside and avoid the power strips or risk unplug-
ging the machine. Other times, because of  poor connections, because of  dust or 
 Figure 5.9 UNHCR-staff  enters registration information in the ProGres databank.
 Source: ©Glasman 
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 Figure 5.10 While the UN-staff  takes the picture, the whole family is helping. 
Source: ©Glasman
because of  the heat, everything stops. So the UNV turns the machine off  and back 
on, taps the power strips, turns off  the overheated laminator. Occasionally the line 
stops and the HP LaserJet Pro400 indicates “blockage in the cartridge zone/open 
door and remove blockage.” So, while the printer reboots, while someone removes 
the paper blockage or changes the ink cartridge, they talk amongst themselves – the 
UNV has made a short list of  Fula vocabulary: “Djama?” (“how are you?”). 
 The noise echoes in the courtyard that acts as a sound box; no one can hear 
each other. The UNV makes a refugee candidate repeat the name of  his daughter: 
“It’s Ada?” “Adja?” “Awa?” The UNV and the refugee look at each other, they 
look at the surrounding crowd, and they recognize that they both cannot hear each 
other, they look at each other, they shake their heads. They laugh. “Adja?” “Ada?” 
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 Some minutes later, a woman starts gesturing grandly. She has just gotten a Pro-
Gres report for herself  and the father of  her children, who also has children with 
other women. Now they are on the same household document, so it is official. She 
is triumphant, laughing loudly: “There’s the marriage certificate!” Everyone laughs. 
 5:30pm 
 The sun is going down. A boy sells braised fish in the courtyard. A woman nurses 
her child. Everyone seems exhausted. The clerk decides to stop registration for 
today. The refugees must leave. The line of  non-registered people is still long. 
They will come back tomorrow. The president of  the refugee committee invites 
the team members to drink tea at his home. Later, they will drink a beer at the 
Total station – the only place that sells cold beer. The clerk offers a Guinness to 
the lieutenant commander of  the mobile unit who is talking sloppily with a soldier. 
 The registration of  refugees is thus a “test” – a physical, moral test, a test of  
waiting for the interview, but also a test of  the truth in the sense of  pragmatic 
sociology: We start with an uncertainty, both about the status of  individuals and 
about their number; we pass through interaction, negotiation, power dynam-
ics; then we conclude with a decision, confirmed by a document – one ProGres 
 Figure 5.11 Printing registration documents – creating an official “refugee.”  
Source: ©Glasman
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document for every adult refugee and one ration card per household. On the 
one hand, an anonymous crowd, on the other, well-identified individuals; on the one 
hand, fugitives, on the other, refugees recognized by international law; on the 
one hand, a movement of  masses, on the other, a statistical population disaggre-
gated by age, sex, and ethnicity. 
 It is not international norms that create refugees, it is the interaction between 
UNHCR members and the candidates. This interaction is localized: To be regis-
tered, one must be there, in Kenzou, on the soccer field, at the moment when the 
UNHCR team is coming through. Not working in the fields, not being cared for 
at the hospital, not waiting for a parent who will soon arrive from Central Africa. 
“If  you’re guarding your cattle in the bush, you’re not in Kenzou!” explains one 
refugee. Several of  the candidates who registered in December have been there 
for several months. In principle, they should already have been registered long 
ago. But during UNHCR’s last visit, they were simply absent. 
 Figure 5.12 Will a child unplug the cables feeding the laptops?  
Source: ©Glasman
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 In Kenzou, in one week (from Tuesday afternoon to Friday evening), the little 
UNHCR team registered 721 individuals grouped into 267 households. 93 By 
Friday evening, the work was not yet done. There were dozens of  non-registered 
people still on the football field. But the team was exhausted. It was Decem-
ber 19, the weekend, the year-end holidays. They decided to stop registration. 
They would leave the day after tomorrow and return in January. They started 
to negotiate with the non-registered people. For more than an hour and a half, 
the small team explained that they had to leave, that it was over, that there were 
no more ration cards. The non-registered people left the football field in small 
groups, disheartened to have waited several days for nothing. Others blew up, 
started to yell. A man in a boubou started threatening the team. Finally, the two 
white Jeeps left the football field. The last time they finished registration, the 
non-registered surrounded the UNHCR vehicle to stop it from leaving. This 
time it went better. 
 The ordeal of  registration is a process at once cognitive (it produces numeri-
cal information) and performative: It actually  creates refugees. Thus, to under-
stand what the refugee statistics signify, one must understand what the refugees 
can do with this status. The UNHCR presents registration as a beneficial activity 
for all (the UN, the refugees, the host government, the donors, etc.). It is true 
that, in accordance with its mandate, the UNHCR offers legal “protection” and 
 Figure 5.13 UNHCR clerk negotiating with asylum seekers.  
Source: ©Glasman
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humanitarian “assistance” to refugees: Access to food distribution, access to mate-
rial aid (tent lodgings, cooking utensils, schooling for children, etc.), free medical 
care, 94 help returning for those who desire it, legal protection in the case of  prob-
lems with the Cameroonian justice system – all that requires that one achieves 
the requisite refugee status. De facto, in Kenzou, one always had to present the 
ProGres document: To the Red Cross to obtain grain, to the pharmacist to get 
medicine, to the police when one is arrested in town, 95 to the soldiers to negotiate 
the price of  passage through a checkpoint. 96 
 But there are also excellent reasons not to show up for registration. First, 
because it is restrictive, costly in terms of  time and energy, but also because 
migrants may not necessarily consider themselves to be refugees. In certain bor-
der societies, international border crossings may be frequent, and may not be 
experienced as relevant to exceptional status. 97 In Mbororo societies, reasons 
to cross the border between Cameroon and Central Africa are numerous: One 
is visiting a parent, one is going to a ceremony, one is on business. 98 For some 
nomadic cattle herders, complex migratory circuits follow the socio-political 
rhythm of  transhumance. Finally, exiles may voluntarily avoid registration, refus-
ing to give personal information – including biometric data 99 – when they cannot 
know what will happen to it. They are not necessarily enthusiastic about a mode 
of  registration whose goal is not just protection and assistance, but also control of  
groups and of  people. In principle, UNHCR should treat its data in a confiden-
tial manner. But the exiles, coming from an authoritarian state and finding refuge 
in a no-less authoritarian state, can have a legitimate lack of  trust in bureau-
cratic institutions. There is a non-negligible risk of  seeing the data collected by 
UNHCR being re-utilized by the host state as a means of  controlling them. 100 It 
has happened that groups of  refugees refuse census as a unit, identifying it as a 
technique of  domination. 101 
 Conversely, other people may seek to be registered even when they are not 
supposed to have the right: An old woman sat with three children. She said she 
arrived in October. She launched into a long monologue under the translator’s 
attention – a moment during which the clerk takes advantage by talking with one 
of  the children, who speaks French: “Where are you from?” “From Yokadouma.” 
“That’s in Cameroon!” The clerk refused to register the family, which he believed 
to be Cameroonian. Other times, it was questions about the stated village of  
origin that aroused suspicion: “Where is this village?” If  the responses were too 
hesitant, or incoherent, the clerk stated that he had revealed an imposter. 102 In 
Kenzou, several dozen people asking for refugee status were Cameroonian, Nige-
rian, or from Chad. 103 For certain Cameroonians, the refugee document and the 
ration card could allow a person to access benefits that were of  interest. In addi-
tion, for those who tried to cross other borders – those who dreamed of  going to 
Europe, or, even better, the United States – refugee status could be an advantage. 
Furthermore, certain Cameroonians have also had the experience of  exodus from 
Central Africa. A woman sat on a bench, accompanied by seven children. She 
said she had arrived from Berbérati where she lived for 11 years, and presents her 
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 Box 5.1 Population census in Cameroon ©Glasman 
 Quantification of  “people in needs” only makes sense in relation to overall 
population figures. The figures on the Cameroonian population were fur-
nished to UN agencies by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). 
This organization worked according to numbers that it co-produced with 
Cameroonian administrative services: The General Population and Hous-
ing Census (RGPH) was conducted by the Central Bureau of  the Census 
and Population Studies (BUCREP), with the financial support and expertise 
of  the UNFPA. But since the population census were outdated (they were 
taken in 1976, 1987, and 2005), 104 these services were working with projec-
tions: They considered a growth of  approximately +3% per year, to obtain 
current figures. 105 In 2017, all the agents thus relied on a report published 
in 2010 that made estimations based on the 2005 census: 
                            Evolution of  the population of  Cameroon 106 
 Date  Population 
 Census 
 01 April 1976  7,663,246 
 01 April 1987  10,493,655 
 11 November 2005  17,463,836 
 Projections 
 01 January 2010  19,406,100 
 01 January 2011  19,892,466 
 01 January 2015  21,917,602 
 01 January 2035  33,955.398 
 These estimates furnished a working basis for humanitarian organization. 
However OCHA, which needed regional and local figures, really worked on 
different databases: The first concerned the départements (departments), an 
administrative unit mostly used by Cameroonian ministries (like MINATD), 
the second concerned health districts, which were the territorial unit used 
by health services (and the Ministry of  Public Health). The health districts 
and departments were not the same – some health districts straddle sev-
eral departments. Yet these two databases did not give the same population 
numbers. According to the OCHA technician, these “figures do not make 
any sense.” 107 
The two databases on territorial units used by OCHA in 2015 
 Territorial unit  Administration database  Health database 
 Admin 0  Country  Country 
 Admin 1  Region  Group of  health districts 
 Admin 2  Department  Health district 
 Admin 3  Neighborhood  Healthcare area 
 Total population  22,179,707  21,917,602 
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Cameroonian identity card. She said that her husband was assassinated by the 
anti-Balaka. “Is he dead?” “No, he is in the hospital.” “He is Central African?” 
“No, he is Cameroonian!” But to be a refugee, it was not enough to have lived in 
Central Africa, to speak Fula, and to have fled the anti-Balaka militias. One had 
to be Central African by nationality. The UNHCR frequently wrongly identified 
nationals wanting to obtain refugee status. 108 In some instances, the UN agency 
considerably overestimated the refugee population. 109 
 Needs through the lens of  legal status (2): 
Host population and internally displaced persons 
 Humanitarian organizations (UN-based and NGOs) united in the IASC have 
been trying, for a dozen years, to implement a unique method of  counting “people 
in need” (that is, the “humanitarian caseload”). To this end, a working group with 
a mandate from the IASC suggested separating the “victims” (dead, disappeared, 
injured) of  a catastrophe from the “affected persons.” 110 Among “affected per-
sons,” the IASC differentiates between the “displaced” (refugees and asylum seek-
ers, internally displaced persons, other displaced persons) and the “non-displaced” 
(the population that accepts the displaced, and the “non-hosts”). 111 
 Among all of  these categories of  “people in need,” the category in which the 
figures were least contested by humanitarian organizations was that of  “refugees.” 
In effect, this category has been the result of  a long-standing legal definition con-
firmed by international treaties and national laws. 112 The other categories are 
less certain: The notion of  “internally displaced persons” (IDPs) has been the 
subject of  an international convention of  African countries – but many countries, 
including Cameroon, were not signatories. 113 For governments, to count refugees 
is to verify that a foreign country is the site of  political violence – but to count the 
internally displaced is to admit violence in one’s own country. Thus, the Cameroo-
nian government refused for several months to establish figures on the internally 
displaced in the North. Whereas the Minawao refugee camp opened in July 2013 
and population movements increased strongly in July 2014, not until 2015 were 
there first figures of  the internally displaced. 
 It was the International Organization for Migration (IOM) that specialized in 
estimations of  displacement. The organization developed a methodology – the 
Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) – that furnished the numbers used today 
by other organizations. The first profiling survey took place in April/May 2015 
in North Cameroon. 114 For ten days, a small team from IOM and UNHCR 
interviewed 477 key informers in 235 “communities” with a questionnaire with 
closed questions – representatives of  the host community, representatives of  the 
displaced, and specialists in public health and education were all interviewed. 115 
This first profiling estimated that some 200,383 people were “displaced,” count-
ing among them 81,693 IDPs, 35,957 returnees (former IDPs), and 12,487 out-of-
camp refugees. 116 This first estimate then made way for regular surveys – four per 
year – on displaced persons in Cameroon. 117 
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 Even if  the DTM of  IOM purveyed authority, 118 the idea of  internally displaced 
persons was a touchy subject. In northern Cameroon – as in the whole region of  
Lake Chad – movements of  populations were inscribed in complex strategies, 
sometimes old, of  responses to violence and to natural disasters. It was often dif-
ficult to differentiate among migrants, refugees, and the displaced. The category 
of  “returnees” used by the DTM illustrated the ambiguities of  such a count. The 
“returnees” (who constituted approximately 15% of  the displaced in 2015) were 
defined as internally displaced persons who had returned to their “place of  ori-
gin.” 119 But in a context of  serial displacements, the concept of  “place of  ori-
gin” raised questions. What is more, if  the returnees came back to where they 
came from, it was unknown whether it was because the situation had improved in 
their “place of  origin” or if, on the contrary, it had worsened in their host village. 
The causes of  displacement were diverse: In the department of  the Mayo Danay, 
though it was a war zone in the fight against Boko Haram, the principal cause of  
displacement was flooding. Finally, the category of  “displaced” was deadlocked 
by an important phenomenon of  displacement: Some villages were emptied of  
their inhabitants by night, so that the people could hide in the bush to avoid Boko 
Haram’s attacks; they returned at dawn. 120 
 Since the 1980s, UNHCR has attributed more and more importance to the 
“host population” – the population eligible for humanitarian aid by virtue of  the 
weight that they must bear in hosting the numerous refugees in their region – in 
its aid programs. By helping the “host population,” UNHCR responded to one 
of  the criticisms that had been levied against it, according to which the refugees 
living in the camps benefited from humanitarian aid (especially food aid), whereas 
the populations that hosted them and live around the camps benefited from no aid 
at all, even though their material living conditions could be similar or even infe-
rior to those of  the refugees. 121 The UNHCR had progressively understood that 
taking this new category of  person into account, far from being limiting, could 
conversely allow them to inflate their activity statistics and thus justify their own 
institutional growth. 
UNHCR has an interest in demonstrating that the host populations are conse-
quential. In Cameroon, in 2014, UNHCR was generous in its estimation of  the 
number of  “host persons”: The organization counted, for every displaced person 
or refugee, 2.4 host persons. But then a surprising paradox appeared: The number 
of  refugees increased (from 280,000 refugees in 2014 to 323,000 in 2016), as well 
as the number of  IDPs (from 40,000 to 112,000), but at the same time, the num-
ber of  “host persons” for whom UNHCR took responsibility diminished (from 
780,000 to 553,000). 122 
 The decrease in the numbers of  the host population did not express the real-
ity of  lessened pressure on populations, but rather a new power relation between 
UN institutions. After the arrival of  OCHA in Cameroon and the large aid actors 
like IOM or the World Food Programme, UNHCR was forced to scale down its 
estimates of  the host population, changing the calculation method. The UNHCR 
counted 2.4 host persons for each refugee or displaced person in 2014; two years 
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later, it only counted 1.3. The decrease in the UNHCR’s influence can thus be 
read in its need estimation figures. 
 Conclusion 
 To follow the chain of  the construction of  humanitarian figures is essential to 
obtain the means to clarify two things. First, on the role of  technology in the con-
struction of  knowledge: The literature on the “data revolution” maintains a flow 
about the different aspects of  the use of  figures, collection techniques, calculation 
techniques, techniques to visualize the data, evaluation and benchmarking tech-
niques, etc. Digital technology, communication technology, and big data are dis-
cussed endlessly. But if  there is really an affinity between the numbers and high 
technology, the two are far from being synonymous. Obviously the Excel spread-
sheets, the databases, the cell phones, the emails, and the clouds. But most humani-
tarian quantification is not “digital” at all. It is a material process: It requires cables, 
Jeeps, generators; everything smells more like gasoline than like silicon. It is often 
a banal, low-tech process: To interview refugees, one ropes off  queues, takes notes 
with pencil and paper, distributes tokens by hand. Likewise, as will be seen in the 
next chapter, to take a nutrition survey, one makes little sketches of  village cases, the 
children are measured with a measuring tape, the houses are marked with chalk. 
 Second, about the question of  power. The quantification of  human needs 
is never an operation of  pure knowledge (if  such a thing even exists). Opera-
tions of  knowledge are always linked to interventions. For example, in the case 
of  refugee registration, it is an operation at once cognitive and performative. Yet 
it would be reductive to see in humanitarian government merely a local variety 
 Table 5.1 People in need in Cameroon according to OCHA 
    2014  2015  2016  2017 
 Cameroonians  1,700,000  1,800,000  2,400,000  2,500,000 
 Hosts   780,000   783,000   553,000   448,000 
 Internally displaced    40,000    60,000   112,000   199,000 
 Foreigners 
 Refugees (UNHCR)   280,000   312,000   323,000   368,000 
 Third-country nationals 
(IOM) 
    2400     3000  N/A  N/A 
 Rounded totals of  
people in need 
 2.0 million  2.1 million  2.7 million  2.9 million 
 Source: J. Glasman, based on OCHA.  Cameroon: Humanitarian needs overview for 2014, 2015, 2016, and 
2017. After 2015, the Overview (HNO) was finalized at the end of  the year for the following year 
(December 2015 for the year 2016). This is why, for example, the number of  internally displaced 
persons estimated by the displacement tracking matrix (DTM) of  IOM in 2015 figures into the HNO 
for 2016. 
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of  a bio-political, neoliberal, or neocolonial power. Of  course, the quantification 
of  needs contributes to reification, depoliticization, and naturalization of  needs 
according to the principle of  a universalist ontology. But the construction of  
humanitarian needs leaves wiggle room to the different actors, their trials, and 
their doubts. 
 It is furthermore this uncertainty and fragility in the field that seems to be 
one of  the principal challenges of  the production of  numbers. One of  the roles 
accorded to the quantification of  needs is to stabilize the field of  humanitarian 
agencies that are in competition with each other. It has to do with contributing to 
the pacification of  the humanitarian field by means of  production numbers, all 
while distinguishing the field from the political space and that of  the aid beneficia-
ries. The object of  needs evaluation is to limit the conflicts between humanitarian 
organizations (that is, to regulate the competition between the organizations) and 
to construct a consensus – the subject of  the next chapter. 
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